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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT CONNIE ALBRECHT 
Appellant Connie Albrecht respectfully submits this brief in reply to the 
matters raised by the briefs of the Appellants David D. Bennett and Wallace R. 
Bennett. 
RESPONSE TO APPELLEES9 STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACT 
STATEMENTS 
The Bennetts in their Appellee briefs have argued many facts and factual 
conclusions that are not in the record before this Court which involve their 
ongoing dispute with Mrs. Albrecht's prior counsel and their former lead counsel 
Robert J. DeBry & Associates. Their fact statements are based upon allegations 
found in their complaints against that firm and that have yet to be established in 
court, and appear to betray other motives. We submit that they are 
objectionable in that regard and should not be included in this appeal. 
The Bennetts' dispute with Mrs. Albrecht's prior counsel Robert J. DeBry 
& Associates is apparently grounded in matters involving legal fees they claim 
following their termination from being associate counsel for the DeBry firm, 
which was lead counsel for the women who had been maintaining damage claims 
against breast implant manufacturers. 
For these reasons, we submit that much of their Statement of the Case and 
Statement of Fact and arguments in that regard are suspect. 
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We will avoid directing further attention to these matters, which take 
away from the issues germane to this appeal. 
POINT I 
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE AND REFUSAL TO ALLOW 
CORRECTIONS TO THE DEPOSITION WAS NOT HARMLESS ERROR 
Mrs. Albrecht has sought dismissal of her case without prejudice. 
Following her April 2000 deposition, she made changes to her deposition 
testimony on the sheets supplied by the court reporter in order to make her 
testimony correct. Following oral argument in June of 2000, the trial court 
dismissed the case with prejudice and disallowed the changes. 
David Bennett essentially claims that the even if the Court abused its 
discretion in dismissing with prejudice and in ruling that substantive changes 
cannot be made to a deposition transcript, it would make no difference in the 
outcome of the case and hence any error was harmless. 
We agree that the applicable case law on this point is embodied in 
Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 886 P.2d 48 (Utah 1994) which states in 
essence that errors by the Court must be substantial and prejudical in that 
without them, there would have been a different result in order to warrant a 
reversal. 
Had the Court dismissed without prejudice, as Mrs. Albrecht requested, 
she would have been free to refile this case at a later time and pursue her 
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remedies. As the order stands, she has been stripped of that right. There is 
certainly a substantial difference between the two. It is substantial and 
prejudicial. 
With respect to the changes that Mrs. Albrecht made to the deposition 
testimony but which were disallowed by the Trial Court, the deposition 
testimony is not necessarily moot as suggested by Mr. Bennett. 
If this Court orders that the dismissal of the case should have been made 
without prejudice, then the deposition testimony may actually become relevant 
should the case be filed and the matter litigated. Hence, it would be important 
for a follow-up deposition to be held at Mrs. Albrecht's expense following the 
refilling of the case to allow the Bennetts to ask questions about the changes that 
were made to the deposition testimony. 
However, even should this Court determine that the case was properly 
dismissed with prejudice, the status of Mrs. Albrecht's deposition testimony is 
not moot. The Bennetts have filed other litigation against Mrs. Albrecht's prior 
counsel Robert DeBry and Associates. Her deposition testimony as it pertains to 
these other matters would be used in those cases. The accuracy of her testimony 
and her credibility as a witness therein would be impacted by the status of the 
deposition testimony at issue here. It would also impact on any future suit she 
could file against the Bennetts should there be any further action by them to 
o j 
breach the confidentiality agreement that Mrs. Albrecht signed in connection 
with the settlement of her implant claims. 
Accordingly, the Trial Court's actions were not harmless error under Rule 
61, URCP. 
Point II 
The Question of Whether Rule 30(e) Had Been Properly Met Was Not 
Raised in the Trial Court And Is Not Properly Before This Court On Appeal 
The Bennetts raised various issues before the trial court concerning why 
Mrs. Albrecht's changes to her deposition should not be allowed. In connection 
with Rule 30(e), URCP, it was claimed by the Bennetts in the trial court, in 
passing, that the notarized changes and accompanying reasons were not made in 
front of the court reporter, although they were made on correction sheets 
supplied by the court report and were returned with the deposition transcript to 
the court reporter. R. 1006-1014 at 1008. 
It is clear in the record that Mrs. Albrecht did comply with the 
instructions on the court reporter's correction sheet in that she made her 
corrections and had them notarized along with the actual transcript and returned 
it all to the court reporter well within 30 days of the taking of the deposition. R 
748-752. Further, she subsequently offered to allow the Bennetts to reopen her 
deposition at her expense to allow for follow-up questions in light of her 
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corrections to the deposition, as suggested with approval in Gaw v. State, 798 
P.2d 11130 (Utah App. 1990). 
However, in Wallace Bennett's Appellee's brief, he now raises a new 
issue by claiming that no request was made before the end of the deposition for 
leave to make subsequent changes or corrections, as set forth in Rule 30(e), 
URCP. While it is common practice in this District that correction sheets 
routinely go out to the deponent from the court reporter with the transcript, and 
while it is common that requests for leave to make changes are not made during 
depositions but subsequent changes are made and submitted anyway, Rule 30(e) 
does, nevertheless, contain the noted provision. It is just not routinely followed 
in those regards. 
However, this objection by Mr. Bennett was not raised at all at the trial 
court level. We submit, in accordance with well established case law that issues 
not raised in the trial court in a timely fashion are deemed waived, and this 
precludes the appellate court from considering their merits on appeal." Hart v. 
Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct.App. 1997). Here 
however, despite many other various objections made to Mrs. Albrecht's written 
corrections, this objection or issue was never even raised, let alone discussed 
with supporting evidence or relevant legal authority to support its argument, to 
allow the trial judge to consider its merits. In this regard, the Hart case 
explains: 
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"To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a 
party must timely bring the issue to the attention 
of the trial court, thus providing the court an 
opportunity to rule on the issue's merits. 'Issues 
not raised in the trial court in timely fashion 
are deemed waived, precluding [the appellate 
court] from considering their merits on appeal.' " 
Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 n. 1 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1993) (citations omitted). Second, the issue must be 
specifically raised, see State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820-21 
(Utah 1989), such that the issue is sufficiently raised to a 
"level of consciousness" before the trial court, James v. 
Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 802 (Utah Ct.App. 1987). Third, the 
party must introduce to the trial court "supporting evidence or 
relevant legal authority" to support its argument. Tolman v. 
Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457, 461 (Utah Ct.App. 
1996) (citation omitted); see also West One Bank, 887 P.2d at 
882 n. 1 (" 'The mere mention of an issue in the pleadings . . . 
is insufficient to raise an issue at trial and thus 
insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.' " (quoting 
LeBaron &Assocs., Inc. v. Rebel Enters., Inc., 823 P.2d 479, 
482-83 (Utah Ct.App. 1991))). 
Point III 
Even Substantive Changes in Testimony to a Deposition Should be Allowed 
Under the Circumstances of This Case. 
The trial court, with the approval of the Bennetts, concluded that Utah 
law does not allow "wholesale alterations" to a deposition as sought by Mrs. 
Albrecht in this case. It stated, after reciting the text of Rule 30(e), that the 
purpose of the rule "is to allow corrections of substantive or typographical errors 
made by the reporter... Rule 30(e) was not designed to allow the wholesale 
alteration of sworn testimony as attempted by Plaintiff in this case." R 1052. 
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The Court in Gaw was aware of the limitations imposed by other 
jurisdictions in relation to subsequent changes to a deposition, many of which 
were noted by the Bennetts in their briefs. But in explaining the law in Utah, this 
Court in Gaw did not impose those restrictions. 
The underlying reason would seem to include the idea that the central 
purpose of a deposition is to get true and accurate facts. Where, as here, if the 
deponent is nervous and makes mistakes that are simply not correct, everyone is 
benefited if we can find out what actually happened. This is why the reopening 
of a deposition, while at the deponent's expense, is an appropriate way to allow 
the parties another attempt to question the witness. 
Mrs. Albrecht did offer to allow the deposition to be reopened, R. 834, 
but it is also correct that she filed a Motion for Protective Order, R. 868-873 and 
956-966, a few days before the deposition was to be held. The reason for the 
motion was because Mrs. Albrecht had a pending Motion to Dismiss that had not 
been heard yet. She specified in her motion and reply brief that she was still 
willing to pay for and attend a follow-up deposition, R. 960-965. However, it 
was viewed at that time that if the Motion to Dismiss was granted as requested, 
the need for the second deposition would not be necessary and this would save 
time and expense for all of the parties. 
We did not contemplate that the trial court would also rule on the 
Bennetts' motions to strike or suppress the deposition changes at the same time 
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the Motion to Dismiss was considered. It was viewed that if the deposition 
testimony was later to be used in some other proceeding, such as following a re-
filing of this case, then the reopening of the deposition could occur then. It was 
not foreseen that the Court would also rule on the Bennetts' motion to strike or 
suppress as well and actually strike the corrections made by Mrs. Albrecht 
before she could give a follow-up deposition. 
Because that happened, however, this appeal has been brought. 
Point IV 
The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Dismissing the Case With 
Prejudice 
Mrs. Albrecht filed a Motion to Dismiss her case because she felt that 
inasmuch as her damages did not appear to be great, it did not appear to be 
worth the time and expense and emotional toll of pursuing the matter at that 
time. However, she wished to reserve her right to refile at a later time should it 
become appropriate. For these reasons she sought a voluntary dismissal without 
prejudice. R. 673-678. 
She also specified that it should be dismissed without prejudice, or not at 
all. R. 758. She was not abandoning the case and was not intending to 
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relinquish a right. It is precisely for this reason that it was a clear abuse of 
discretion by the trial court to dismiss with prejudice - which is tantamount to or 
essentially an adjudication on the merits 
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Had she not made the motion, the issue of dismissal would not have come 
up at all. She would have proceeded with the reopening of her deposition and 
would have proceeded with her defense against the Motion for Summary 
Judgment brought by the Bennetts. She would have conducted discovery and 
litigated her case. Absent this Motion to Dismiss by Mrs. Albrecht, the case 
would have continued onward. 
While the trial court indeed does have great latitude in its discretionary 
decisions, it must have a reasonable basis for its decision. State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). We submit that there was no such basis here. 
The case was not anywhere near the stage needed for it to be ready for 
trial nor had it progressed to any degree. Mrs. Albrecht's deposition in April of 
2000 was the only discovery that had been conducted at all. Wallace Bennett's 
lengthy answer to the complaint had been filed only a month prior on March 7, 
2000, R. 629-651. 
Prior to that, there had been substantial disagreements involving David 
Bennett's Motion to Dismiss that was denied and a Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions 
by Mrs. Albrecht's prior counsel that was later withdrawn. Also, a motion had 
been brought to disqualify Mrs. Albrecht's prior counsel which was granted by 
the trial court in February of 2000. These matters are the only matters of 
substance that had taken place before Mrs. Albrecht's Motion to Dismiss was 
filed in April of 2000. Although the case had been filed as a class action 
9 
lawsuit, R. 1-11, the putative class was never certified nor was certification 
sought by Mrs. Albrecht. 
With the case in this posture, the Motion to Dismiss was filed. Shortly 
thereafter, the Defendants filed their Motions for Summary Judgment and 
various motions to strike the deposition corrections and various affidavits. But, 
procedurally, the case was not very far along at all. 
In light of what had transpired so far, it had the appearance of becoming 
even more costly and time consuming for the parties and the trial court -
regardless of whether it would or could be certified as a class action. 
This threat was not a basis for dismissing with prejudice. Nor was the 
case far enough along the track for the court to properly conclude that a 
dismissal with prejudice was warranted. The case was an emotional one for the 
Defendants, but that aspect aside, very little had actually happened. 
The trial court should be directed to enter a dismissal without prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
It was not harmless error for the trial court under the circumstances to 
dismiss this case with prejudice following the Appellant's request for dismissal 
without prejudice. The trial court abused its discretion in entering a dismissal 
with prejudice. The trial court did not properly apply the law by concluding that 
substantive changes cannot be made to the deposition transcript. 
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The judgment of the trial court should be reversed with directions that 
the case be dismissed without prejudice and that changes to the Albrecht 
deposition be allowed following a reopening of the deposition. 
Dated this 7th day of May, 2001. 
Mfea 
Phillip B. Shell 
Attorney for Appellant Connie Albrecht 
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